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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE "FIGHTING WORDS
DOCTRINE" IS APPLIED TO ABUSIVE
LANGUAGE TOWARD POLICEMEN
"One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public
men and measures-and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but
the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." 1
Johnney C. Wilson was participating in an anti-Vietnam War demon-
stration on August 18, 1966 in which the members of his group were
picketing Army headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. When the inductees
arrived at the building, the demonstrators began to block the door so that
the inductees could not enter. When the police attempted to move the
protesters, a scuffle began. Wilson was indicted for making the following
statements to two police officers: "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you, you
son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death" and "You son of a bitch, if you
ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces."'2  He was
convicted on two counts of assault and battery and two counts of oppro-
brious or abusive language.3  The case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court on the issue of abusive language. The Court held,
4
that the statute, which had not been narrowed by the Georgia courts to
apply only "to 'fighting words' which by their very utterance . . . tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace,"" was unconstitutional for vague-
ness and overbreadth.0 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
The problem of abusive language recurs frequently today as a result
of American society's preoccupation with many emotional social issues.
People who express their viewpoints in many forms of language do not
1. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-
74 (1944).
2. Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 534, 156 S.E.2d 446, 449 (1967).
3. The defendant was convicted under GA. CODE § 26-6303 (1933) which provides
in relevant part: "Any person, who shall, without provocation, use to or of another,
and in his presence . . .opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause
a breach of the peace . . .shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." As amended, GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-2610 (1972).
4. 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (hereinafter cited in text as Gooding).
5. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
6. 405 U.S. at pp. 520-30.
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often follow customary standards of polite expression. However, as
Thomas Emerson has stated, "a system of free expression . . .recognizes
the right of the citizen to disagree with, arouse, antagonize and shock
his fellow citizens and the government." '7
The case law prior to Gooding prohibited only that form of expression
known as "fighting words." Such words were not considered free expres-
sion and were subject to governmental regulation. This note will review
the case history of the "fighting words" requirement which is a judicial
addition to disorderly conduct statutes. The note will also concern itself
with the special problem of a citizen's use of "unseemly expletives" toward
a policeman that was presented in Gooding and which has occurred fre-
quently in disorderly conduct cases.
The first significant case of this nature was Cantwell v. Connecticut.8
Cantwell had stopped two men, asked and received permission to play a
record which attacked their religion. Both men became angry and were
tempted to strike Cantwell, who eventually left their presence. The Su-
preme Court set aside Cantwell's conviction for inciting a breach of the
peace because there was no evidence that he was personally offensive
or was involved in any argument with those interviewed. The Court lim-
ited the right of a state to regulate speech to those situations "[w]hen
clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon
the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or
order appears. .... 9
The "fighting words" doctrine became the dominant principle in free
speech controversies in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.10 A Jehovah
Witness had caused some public resentment while distributing handbills
on the street. He was taken from the scene by police officers because
of the threat of violence from the crowd. While he was being led to the
police station, Chaplinsky told the City Marshall that " '[y]ou are a . . .
7. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J.
877, 894 (1963).
8. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
9. Id. at 308. The "clear and present danger doctrine" was first stated in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) where the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of a Socialist Party member for distributing leaflets urging men to oppose
the draft. Mr. Justice Holmes explained that "the question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. Subsequent cases affirming this doc-
trine have included Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), American Com-
munications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), and Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331 (1946).
10. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist . , The defendant was
convicted under the state disorderly conduct statute. The United States
Supreme Court upheld the conviction because it believed that the state
supreme court had properly limited the statute to the use of words in a
public place which directly tended to "cause acts of violence by the person
to whom, individually, the remark is addressed. . . . The test is what
men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight. .... -12 Mr. Justice Murphy, speak-
ing for the Court, emphasized that the right of free speech is not absolute:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the in-
sulting or 'fighting words'-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace .... 13
However, the Court returned to the "clear and present danger" test,
first stated in Cantwell,14 in Terminiello v. Chicago.15 This case involved
a Nazi speaker who had addressed a public meeting. Terminiello was
convicted of disorderly conduct but the Supreme Court reversed on the
basis of the trial court's charge to the jury which had construed "breach of
the peace" to include "speech which stirs the public to anger, invites
dispute, brings about a condition of unrest or creates a disturbance."' 0
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, conceded that freedom of
speech was not absolute but felt that such speech was protected against
punishment unless "shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of
a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, an-
noyance, or unrest.' 17
The Court also focused on the reaction of a crowd to a speaker in
Feiner v. New York.' s The petitioner made some derogatory remarks
about government officials. He also urged black people to rise up in
arms and fight for equal rights. The speech stirred some excitement but
only one person threatened violence if police did not act.' 9 The Supreme
11. Id. at 569.
12. State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 313-320, 18 A.2d 754, 758-762 (1941).
13. 315 U.S. at 571-72. See Note, Prohibition of Offensive Utterances Not Vio-
lative of the Right of Free Speech, 2 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 224 (1942) and Note,
Constitutional Law-Limitations on the Freedom of Speech, 22 B.U.L. REV. 446
(1942).
14. 310 U.S. at 307.
15. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
16. ld. at 4.
17. Id.
18. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
19. Id. at 317.
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Court upheld the action of the police officers in removing the speaker
from the platform, on the basis that an imminent breach of the peace was
threatened by Feiner's actions. The Court recognized the danger of giv-
ing overzealous policemen complete discretion to silence speakers advo-
cating unpopular views but felt that the case involved a situation where
the speaker passed the point of argument and was inciting to riot. The
Feiner opinion was unduly restrictive in comparison to those boisterous
situations found in subsequent decisions. Yet Feiner did employ the
judicial technique of looking at the circumstances of the speech, including
the actual response of the audience, in determining whether such speech
was justifiably restricted by local authorities.
The Supreme Court was confronted with a series of free speech cases
arising out of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. In Cox
v. Louisiana 120 two cases resulted from one set of facts in which the
petitioner led a group of Black students who were protesting the jailing
of their fellow students. Since the original grievance involved the failure
of stores to serve blacks, Cox urged his followers to go to those stores
which had practiced discrimination. Cox 121 was the result of the peti-
tioner's conviction for violating a Louisiana statute making it a crime to
congregate with others with the intent to provoke a "breach of the peace."
Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court in both cases, held that this
statute gave undue discretion to the Louisiana authorities in depriving
Cox of his rights of free speech and assembly. The Court also reversed
Cox's conviction for demonstrating outside a courthouse in violation of a
law which prohibited that particular act.22  The Court felt that the stat-
ute itself was a valid law but that the petitioner's arrest for failure to dis-
perse was unjustified after state officials had previously given permission
for the demonstration to take place at the same location. The Cox cases
were among the first to distinguish forms of expression as primarily speech
or conduct. There were certain forms of conduct, mixed with speech,
which could be regulated: "We emphatically reject the notion . . . that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to
those who would communicate ideas by conduct, such as patrolling,
marching and picketing . . . as these amendments afford to those who
communicate ideas by pure speech. '23
20. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
21. id.
22. Cox v. Louisiana 11379 U.S. 559 (1965).
23. 379 U.S. at 555. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) stated that "[f]reedom of expression can be suppressed if,
and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an
[Vol. XXII
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Other federal courts have been confronted with similar situations. A
section of the Atlanta city ordinance was declared unconstitutional in the
case of Carmichael v. Allen.24  The ordinance declared it to be "...
unlawful for any person to act in a violent, turbulent, quarrelsom, bois-
terous, indecent, or disorderly manner or to use profane, vulgar, or ob-
scene language."' 25  This statute was used to convict Stokely Carmichael
for statements which he made after the shooting of a black man by police
The federal district court rejected the all-encompassing nature of the or-
dinance as an unconstitutional restriction on free speech and assembly. 26
Similar statutes were found in the cases of the University Committee
to End the War in Viet Nam v. Gunn27 and Wright v. Montgomery.28
Several anti-war protesters were arrested in the former case after they
had been attacked by soldiers. Their conviction was based on a Texas
statute which prohibited "loud, vociferous or obscene . . . language . . .
in a manner calculated to disturb the person or persons present .... -29
The district court, in declaring the statute unconstitutional, stated that the
law relied on "calculations as to the boiling point of a particular per-
son . . ." and was not an evaluation of the comments themselves.30
The latter case demonstrated that a statute would be upheld if construed
within narrowly defined limits. The ordinance was very similar to that
of the previous case. However, the measure was strictly limited by state
courts to violent and menacing conduct.3 1
The Supreme Court cases of Coates v. City of Cincinnati 2 and Cohen
inseparable part of it." See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) where
the petitioners, civil rights demonstrators, were convicted for breach of the peace on
the basis of a statute which prohibited speech that "stirred people to anger, invited
public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest." Id. at 238. The Court stated
that the conviction should be reversed because the statute infringed on the petitioner's
rights of free speech and assembly. See also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966),
where the Court felt that the actions of students who blocked the non-public driveway
constituted conduct. The Court upheld the state trespass statute because it was
aimed at a limited kind of conduct and was not unconstitutionally vague. See also
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1
24. 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
25. "Sec. 20-7 of Chapter, RELATED LAWS CODE AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF
ATLANTA," Vol. 11, p. 1022.
26. 267 F. Supp. at 998-99.
27. 289 F. Supp. 469 (W. D. Tex. 1968).
28. 406 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1969).
29. TEX. PEN. CODE art. 474 (Supp. 1952).
30. 289 F. Supp. at 475.
31. 406 F.2d at 874.
32. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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v. California"3 are significant, with respect to Gooding, because these de-
cisions contained the latest treatment of broad disorderly conduct statutes
which were not narrowly construed by state courts.
The Coates'4 decision struck down a disorderly assembly ordinance
which provided, in part, that "It shall be unlawful for three or more per-
sons to assemble . . . and . . . conduct themselves in a manner annoying
to persons passing by."'35 Justice Brennan's majority opinion stated that
anti-social conduct could not be regulated by an ". . . ordinance whose
violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is an-
noyed."'36  The Court noted that this statute had not been narrowed by
any construction of the Ohio Supreme Court. Since the law was "overly
broad" on its face, the measure was unconstitutional and there was no
need to examine the details of the conduct found to be annoying. 37
The case arising out of Paul Cohen's controversial jacket was the lead-
ing free speech opinion before Gooding because of its clear distinction
between speech and conduct. This young man was wearing a jacket,
bearing the words "fuck the draft," while in the corridor of a county
courthouse. The California Court of Appeals upheld the lower court
conviction on the grounds that the "word" was inherently likely to cause
violence.38 The Supreme Court reversed the decision 'on the grounds
that a state may not, absent a clear danger of violence, make the simple
use of a four-letter expletive a criminal offense. The statute in question
prohibited one from disturbing the peace "by loud or unusual noise, or
by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or threatening, traducing, quarreling
. . . or fighting . . . ,,19 The Court found that the statute had been
construed broadly so as to limit forms of expression often associated with
unpopular views or life styles without a showing that the use of such words
intended to arouse the "ordinary citizen" to violence.40
One can argue that the use of such expressions violate the privacy of
persons who have these distasteful terms forced upon them. However,
"the mere presence of unwilling listeners does not justify curtailing all po-
tentially offensive speech."'41 Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority,
33. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
34. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
35. §§ 901-16, CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CINCINNATI (1956).
36. 402 U.S. at 614.
37. Id. at 616.
38. People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (Supp. 1970).
40. 403 U.S. at 20.
41. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
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was careful to point out that the issue in the case was one of speech,
rather than conduct, because Cohen's conviction was only based on the
offensiveness of the words he used. His opinion stated that a court
cannot outlaw an expression as offensive conduct either on the theory
".. . that its use is inherently likely to cause violent reaction or . . .that
the States, acting as guardian of public morality, may properly remove
this offensive word from the public vocabulary. '42
The situation in Gooding goes one step beyond Cohen43 in terms of
the classification of disorderly conduct problems. In Cohen, a policeman
was confronted with a symbolic form of expression while the officers in
Gooding were faced with the actual verbal expression of the defendant.
In both cases state courts: (1) failed to limit the application of the perti-
nent statute to "fighting words" and (2) found it unlikely that the police-
men, who were recipients of the expression, would resort to violence.
The Georgia statute in Gooding was declared unconstitutional because,
as construed by the state courts, it applied to speech protected by the
first amendment. It was seen from Cohen4 4 and Terminiello4 5 that vulgar
or offensive expression, in itself, is still protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments. Therefore, the statute must be construed with such
specificity so as not to interfere with protected expression. 46  The Court
will look to the construction given by state courts when there is serious
doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute.47
42. 403 U.S. at 23. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that part of his opinion which
emphasized that a state could not forbid the mere use of a word with the following
statement: "For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps
more distasteful that most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Id. at 25. For a more detailed analysis of Cohen,
See Thomas, Purging Unseemly Expletives from the Public Scene: A Constitutional
Dilemma, 47 IND. L.J. 142 (1971) and Note, Symbolic Protest by the Use of
Opprobrious Language, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 546 (1971).
43. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
44. Id.
45. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
46. The Constitution forbids states from punishing the use of words not within
narrowly limited classes of speech. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Supreme Court, in
upholding the right of the NAACP to challenge racial discrimination in the courts
despite Virginia's claim that the organization was soliciting legal business, stated
that the threat of sanctions for the exercise of first amendment activities ". . . may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions. Be-
cause first amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963).
47. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). The
19731 CASE NOTES 731
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court concluded that the Georgia courts failed to follow
the specificity required by the "fighting words" doctrine. 4  In Elmore v.
State,49 a young man was convicted under a similar statute, which pro-
hibited the use of opprobrious or abusive language to an officer who had
him in legal custody ". . . if the character of the language is such as
would ordinarily tend to cause a breach of the peace when addressed to a
private person."5 In Jackson v. State,51 it was held that the jury was to
determine whether the words "God damn you, why don't you get off the
road?" were words which, under the circumstances tended to cause a breach
of the peace. In the case of Samuels v. State"5 2 the court of appeals inter-
preted the term "breach of the peace" to include "all violations of public
peace or order or decorum . . ." and applied the law to the actions of
Blacks arrested for sitting at a segregated lunch counter. The defendants
were convicted of assembling for the purpose of disturbing the public
peace. Finally, the district court, in the present case, held that the words
charged were in themselves opprobrious and abusive and that it was not
necessary to determine in what manner these words tended to cause a
breach of the peace. 53
These cases illustrated the practice of the Georgia courts to either con-
strue the use of opprobrious or abusive language as a breach of the peace
or leave the question to the jury. The appellant maintained that the
words opprobrious and abusive connoted disgraceful, reproachful or in-
sulting language and that such words tend to cause a breach of the peace
in certain situations.14 Yet the appellee and the Supreme Court felt that
any standard short of "fighting words" was unacceptable. Furthermore,
such vague terms would give the jury unlimited discretion in applying
these terms to a specific case. 55
The fact that the words "opprobrious and abusive" have greater reach
than "fighting words" make the Georgia statute void for vagueness and
overbreadth. The defect of overbreadth was originally defined as statutory
language "in which men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
Court noted, in this case involving the seizure of obscene photographs, that a
statute could be "saved" by judicial construction.
48. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
49. 15 Ga. App. 461, 83 S.E. 799 (1914).
50. Id. at 461, 83 S.E. at 799.
51. 14 Ga. App. 19, 80 S.E. 20 (1913).
52. 103 Ga, App. 66, 67, 118 S.E.2d 231, 232 (1967).
53. Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S.E.2d 446, 449 (1967).
54. Brief for Appellant at 18, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
55. Brief for Appellee at 3-5, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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at its meaning."56 It is based on the premise that no man should be
punished for violating a statute that is not "sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties. '5 7  The doctrine of "void-for-vagueness" has been
explained as a "doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness . . . used by
the Supreme Court for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added
protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms."5"
This "buffer zone" is created in those cases where the particular communi-
cation might not have warranted absolute immunity under the first amend-
ment.59  But federal courts often feel that state laws exceed constitutional
bounds because such laws have a "chilling effect" on speech.
Since overly broad or vague statutes may inhibit persons from exercis-
ing their right of free speech, the Court concluded that one may attack
a statute as being overly broad without showing that his conduct could
not be regulated by a properly drawn statute.60 This requirement was
eliminated because of the tendency to consider the validity of a statute
on its face when dealing with civil liberty questions because of the threat
that a broad statute presents in inhibiting free expression. 6'
The dissent reiterated the appellant's insistence that the Georgia statute
will not suppress constitutionally protected speech. Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Mr. Justice Blackmun, maintained that the statute was only
directed at personal, face-to-face, abusive language.6 2 However, it must
be remembered that Johnney Wilson addressed his words to a police offi-
56. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
57. Id. at 391. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844, 852 (1970): "The overbreadth doctrine . . . results often in
the wholesale invalidation of the legislature's handiwork, creating a judicial-legisla-
tive confrontation.
In the end, this departure from the normal method of judging the constitutionality
of statutes must find justification in the favored status of rights to expression and
association of the constitutional scheme."
58. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 67, 75-76 (1960).
59. Id. at 75.
60. 405 U.S. at 521, in reference to Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-
92 (1965).
61. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948). The general rule was that the defendant cannot claim that a statute is
unconstitutional in some of its reaches if it is constitutional as applied to him.
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §14 (2d Ed. 1970). See also Yazoo & Miss.
R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 21-24 (1960).
62. 405 U.S. at 532.
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cer. Although such disrespect for a public official may be reprehensible,
the officer is trained to react professionally to such comments. Since his
words would not ordinarily provoke a violent reaction when addressed
to a policeman, they cannot be considered "fighting words." This fact
was recognized in Williams v. District of Columbia.6" The defendant
was convicted in a lower court of using profane, indecent and obscene
words to a policeman. The court of appeals reversed the decision classi-
fying the statute as overly broad. The opinion stated that the statute
would be valid if it were interpreted to require that the language be spoken
in circumstances which threatened a breach of the peace.6 4 The Court
cited the Model Penal Code in expressing its doubt that the particular
situation would have resulted in a breach of the peace. "Insofar as the
theory of disorderly conduct rests on the tendency of the actor's behavior
to provoke violence in others, one must suppose that policemen, employed
and trained to maintain order, would be least likely to be provoked to dis-
orderly responses."6 5
Three Supreme Court cases followed the Gooding treatment of the
"overbreadth doctrine" and the problem of abusive utterances toward
police. In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,66 a disgruntled teacher addressed a
school board meeting and used the words "mother fucker" on numerous
occasions. He was convicted under a disorderly person statute which pro-
hibited indecent language in a public place. The conviction was reversed
because the statute was not limited to "fighting words" but had only been
construed to apply to those words which "affect the sensibilities of the
hearer."' 67 Similarly, in Lewis v. City of New Orleans,68 appellant ad-
dressed the policemen who were arresting her son as "goddamn fucking
police." She was convicted under a statute prohibiting the use of obscene
language toward a policeman on duty. The Court also reversed that con-
viction. Mr. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, had no doubt that
Mrs. Lewis' remarks would be "fighting words" if addressed to a private
citizen. But he emphasized that the "fighting words" standard could not
be applied where the words are addressed to a police officer.6 9 Finally,
63. 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
64. Id. at 639.
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1 Comment 4(c) at 14 (Tentative Draft No. 13,
1961).
66. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
67. Id. at 904-05, in reference to State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 353, 266 A.2d
579, 583-84 (1970).
68. 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
69. Id.
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the Court reversed a lower court decision in Brown v. Oklahoma,70 in
which the appellant had been invited to a meeting as a representative of
the Black Panther Party. The appellant expressed his opinion of police
in less than glowing terms. Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion
pointed out that the appellant's language in such circumstances should
have been anticipated. 71
Two recent denials of certiorari by the Supreme Court indicate that the
Court found the contested disorderly conduct statutes were sufficiently
definite so as not to be considered unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
The case of particular interest to this jurisdiction is of City of Chicago
v. Weiss 72 in which the petitioner was arrested for disobeying a police
dispersal order during the 1968 Democratic National Convention. He
based his appeal on the alleged unconstitutionality of Chapter 193, Section
(d) of the Municipal Code of Chicago which states as follows: "A person
commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: fails to obey a lawful
order of dispersal by a person known by him to be a peace officer under
circumstances where three or more persons are committing acts of disor-
derly conduct in the immediate vicinity, which acts are likely to cause
substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm." The
Supreme Court, in denying certiorari, felt that the petitioners first, fourth
and fourteenth amendment rights were not violated by either the statute
or the dispersal order. 73
In Waller v. City of St. Petersburg,7 4 the Court also upheld a Florida
statute prohibiting verbal abuse of policemen which was much more spe-
cific than the Georgia law in Gooding. The ordinance made it unlawful
"to challenge to fight, assault, strike, verbally abuse or make derogatory
remarks to a police officer in the performance of his duties."7 5  The
Court also felt that this ordinance was not unconstitutionally overbroad.7"
The last cases reflect the three step process used by the Court in dis-
orderly conduct cases from Chaplinsky77 to Gooding. The Court will
examine the wording of the statute, its interpretation by state courts, and
the particular circumstances in which the law is applied. The third
requirement becomes especially significant when the objectionable language
70. 408 U.S. 914 (1972).
71. Id.
72. 51 111. 2d 113, 281 N.E.2d 310 (1972).
73. 51 Ill. 2d 113, 281 N.E.2d 310, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
74. 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1972).
75. 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
76. Id.
77. 315 U.S. 568 (1962).
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is directed towards a police officer. Although the Gooding decision
may be appreciated for its stubborn defense of free expression, it does
not resolve the problem of abuse toward police. Perhaps the solution lies
in the recommendation of the Model Penal Code that a policeman "pref-
ace the arrest by a warning."78 Yet even an exact constitutional formula
will not negate the fact that the right of free expression requires tolerance
on the part of all citizens. Former Attorney General John Mitchell ac-
knowledged this fact when he said, "We cannot expect political demon-
strations to be conducted like prayer meetings. We must expect language
which may incite hostility or may be obscene. The First Amendment pro-
tects all of us, including men and women who choose to be unruly, un-
reasonable or impolite." '79
Mark Pearlstein
78. "Where the policeman is the victim of the provocative words of abuse, he
must preface his arrest by a warning. It appears that there is no first amendment
right to engage in deliberate and continued baiting of policemen by verbal excess
which have no apparent purpose other than to provoke reaction." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 250.1 Comment 4(c) at 14 (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1961).
79. L.A. Times, July 4, 1970 § 1 at 2, col. 4.
[Vol. XXII
